An investigation of operational decision making in situ: Incident command in the UK Fire and Rescue Service by Cohen-Hatton, Sabrina Rachel et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/72012/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Cohen-Hatton, Sabrina Rachel, Butler, Philip C. and Honey, Robert Colin 2015. An investigation of
operational decision making in situ: Incident command in the UK Fire and Rescue Service. Human
Factors 57 (5) , pp. 793-804. 10.1177/0018720815578266 file 
Publishers page: 
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
  1 
An investigation of operational decision making in situ: 1 
Incident command in the UK Fire and Rescue Service 2 
 3 
 4 
Sabrina R. Cohen-Hatton
1, 2, 3
, P.C. Butler
4 
and R.C. Honey
1 
5 
1
Cardiff University, 
2
Chief Fire and Rescue Officer Association, 6 
3
South Wales Fire and Rescue Service, 
4
London Fire Brigade 7 
 8 
 9 
Précis 10 
Decision making at operational incidents involving the UK Fire and Rescue Service was 11 
investigated using first-person video footage.  This footage was independently coded and used 12 
to guide recollection by participants.  The resulting analysis revealed marked departures in the 13 
decision making process from the normative models that have informed operational guidance.    14 
 15 
Running head: Incident Command 16 
 17 
 18 
Word count:  Introduction (1283), Method (729), Results (2528), and Discussion (821) = 5361  19 
 20 
 21 
Revision submitted in December 2014 to:  Human Factors22 
  2 
Abstract 23 
Objective.  To better understand the nature of decision making at operational incidents in 24 
order to inform operational guidance and training.   25 
Background.  Normative models of decision making have been adopted in the guidance 26 
and training for emergency services.  These models assume that decision makers assess the current 27 
situation, formulate plans, and then execute the plans.  However, our understanding of how 28 
decision making unfolds at operational incidents remains limited. 29 
Methods.  Incident commanders, attending 33 incidents across six UK Fire and Rescue 30 
Services, were fitted with head-mounted cameras; and the resulting video footage was later 31 
independently coded, and used to prompt participants to provide a running commentary 32 
concerning their decisions. 33 
Results.  The analysis revealed that assessment of the operational situation was most often 34 
followed by plan execution rather than plan formulation; and there was little evidence of 35 
prospection about the potential consequences of actions.  This pattern of results was consistent 36 
across different types of incident, characterized by level of risk and time pressure, but was affected 37 
by the operational experience of the participants. 38 
Conclusion.  Decision making did not follow the sequence of phases assumed by 39 
normative models and conveyed in current operational guidance, but instead was influenced by 40 
both reflective and reflexive processes.   41 
Application.  These results have clear implications for understanding operational decision 42 
making as it occurs in situ and suggest a need for future guidance and training to acknowledge the 43 
role of reflexive processes. 44 
Keywords: dynamic decision making, emergency services, operational models 45 
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Understanding decision making by emergency responders has the potential to inform training and 46 
practice, and thereby to improve safety.  It could also shape models of naturalistic decision 47 
making.  For example, fire officers responsible for incident command need to make decisions in 48 
highly challenging environments, which can be characterized as time pressured, with high stakes 49 
and often involving ill-structured problems (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).  The consequences of 50 
ineffective decision making in such environments can be costly, with human error being cited as 51 
the cause of most fire-fighter injuries (DCLG, 2013).  Error could perhaps be mitigated by 52 
understanding the basis of decisions and ensuring that through training personnel have the 53 
appropriate cognitive, social and personal resources (Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008).  54 
However, our understanding of operational decision making in situ is limited by a paucity of 55 
directly relevant data.  Evidence from studies using simulated incidents or those requiring 56 
retrospection (on the part of incident commanders) can provide only relatively remote clues about 57 
the process of interest: decision making at emergency incidents.  In the present study this issue 58 
was addressed through a detailed analysis of dynamic decision making at actual incidents that 59 
were attended by officers across the UK Fire and Rescue Service and video recorded.  Without 60 
such direct evidence, many emergency services have adopted normative, reflective models, as a 61 
basis for operational training and understanding, when a variety of theoretical perspectives are 62 
relevant to this and other examples of naturalistic decision making.   63 
Reflective Models of Operational Decision-making 64 
Dewey (1933) argued that when people solve problems, they do so in an analytical and 65 
rational way, that proceeds according to an orderly sequence of phases.  These ideas are echoed in 66 
normative models of decision-making that typically identify three key phases: Situation 67 
assessment (SA), plan formulation (PF) and plan execution (PE; e.g., Lipshitz & Bar-Ilan, 1996; 68 
van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2011).  This type of model represents one perspective that has 69 
been taken in studies involving the emergency services, including the Police (van den Heuvel et 70 
  4 
al., 2011) and at major incidents requiring a multi-agency response (House, Power & Alison, 71 
2013).  The normative three-phase model can also be identified within the current decision model 72 
adopted in the Fire and Rescue Services Incident Command System in the UK (CFRAU, 2008).  73 
In situation assessment, the decision maker forms an understanding of the situation by considering 74 
the information, cues and clues available to them.  The result of this phase provides the foundation 75 
of the planning process, and consists of both understanding and a projection of the situation into 76 
the future (Endsley, 1995).  For example, fire incident commanders are expected to gather 77 
information that is relevant to the incident, resources, and hazards, in order to inform the selection 78 
of the appropriate course of action.  The plan formulation phase includes identifying the problem 79 
or problems and generating possible solutions, and the selection of an appropriate course of action.  80 
Here, fire incident commanders are expected to identify objectives and develop a tactical plan 81 
where suitable actions are selected and planned.  The final phase of plan execution involves the 82 
implementation of the plan.  For fire incident commanders, selected actions are communicated to 83 
those who will implement them, and subsequent activity is controlled by the incident commander 84 
to ensure that it is carried out appropriately and effectively.  However, the fact that the normative 85 
model is embedded within training and operational guidance need not mean that it represents how 86 
decisions are made in practice. 87 
Reflexive Components of Decision Making 88 
It has been argued that normative models of decision making, like those outlined above, do 89 
not capture how decisions are often made (Klein, 1993).  In addition, decisions can involve the use 90 
of heuristics including those based upon previous experience (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007; Shafir, 1994; 91 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1979).  Also, cues in the environment can activate or prime knowledge 92 
structures (schemas) that include actions, goals and expectancies previously related to that or 93 
similar environments (e.g., recognition-primed decision making; Klein, 1993).  In such cases, 94 
options are not evaluated against one another, but rather the decision to act might be one that is 95 
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deemed, by the decision maker, to be satisfactory rather than optimal (e.g., Abernathy & Hamm, 96 
1993; Klein, 1993, 2003).  Alternatively, the basis for an action might be more reflexive and 97 
automatic, affected by previously established associations that have developed between situational 98 
cues, actions and outcomes (e.g., Doya, 2008).  The generality of such acquired (associative) 99 
influences and the variety of ways in which they can affect behavior suggests that they could exert 100 
a powerful influence over incident command at operational environments (e.g., Balleine & 101 
Ostlund, 2007; Cohen-Hatton, George, Haddon & Honey, 2013; Dickinson, 1980).  These more 102 
reflexive, procedural influences might or might not be appropriate to the given operational 103 
environment.  104 
The principal aim of the present study was to investigate the basis of decisions made at a 105 
range of incidents responded to by the UK Fire and Rescue Service.  To do so, the unfolding 106 
activities of incident commanders were observed, video-recorded and then independently coded as 107 
reflecting situation assessment (SA), plan formulation (PF), and plan execution (PE).  The 108 
transitions between categories were used to investigate whether decision making was based upon 109 
reflective, normative processes in which case SA should be followed by PF and then PE, or more 110 
reflexive processes, where SA is followed immediately by PE (cf. Sacket, 1979).  The results of a 111 
previous study of fire incident commanders, using retrospective interviews, suggested that officers 112 
do not evaluate alternative courses of action, but appeared to be reacting on the basis of prior 113 
experience, and choosing a satisfactory course of action (Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor, 1989; 114 
see also, Klein, 1998).  Although the completeness of such recollections can be limited (Omodei 115 
& McLennan, 1994), it can be improved (in simulated exercises) by using first-person footage 116 
from helmet-mounted video cameras with fire officers (McLennan, Omodei, Rich & Wearing, 117 
1997; see also, Omodei, McLennan & Wearing, 2005; Omodei, McLennan & Whitford, 1998).   118 
Here, the independent codings of video footage were coupled with information from a subsequent 119 
interview, in which the recall of the incident by the commander was assisted by the presentation of 120 
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the original footage.  To provide an assessment of any nascent plan formulation during situation 121 
assessment, a supplementary analysis examined the level of situational awareness displayed 122 
immediately prior to either plan formulation or plan execution phases (Endsley, 1995).  In this 123 
analysis, SA was coded as: Level 1, which corresponds to perception of elements of the situation; 124 
Level 2, which relates to an understanding of the situation; and Level 3, which involves 125 
anticipation of the likely development of the situation, and might serve as further evidence of 126 
planning. 127 
An additional aim of this study was to assess the role of operational command experience 128 
in the behavior of officers at incidents.  In most professional domains, experience gradually shapes 129 
the development of high-level, complex skills (e.g., Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996).  However, 130 
decision making experience in many operational contexts is necessarily limited (because of the 131 
tenure of the officer or the infrequent nature of the incidents themselves) while the consequences 132 
of errors can be life threatening.  The way in which experience interacts with the nature of 133 
decision making at operational contexts in general, and the Fire and Rescue Service in particular, 134 
is an important issue that has not yet been addressed.  Moreover, this issue is particularly timely 135 
given the downward trend in the number of operational incidents over recent years (DCLG, 2012), 136 
with the consequence that the levels of operational exposure are expected to continue to decline.   137 
If prior command experience shapes the nature of operational decisions (cf. Klein, 1998; Klein et 138 
al., 1989), then the transitions identified in the primary analysis (i.e., involving SA, PF, and PE) 139 
should be related to the participants’ experience. 140 
Method 141 
Participants.  Twenty-three incident commanders (22 male and 1 female) volunteered for 142 
this study and provided informed consent for their participation.  They were drawn from six UK 143 
Fire and Rescue Services: East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service, Hampshire Fire and Rescue 144 
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Service, South Wales Fire and Rescue Service, Tyne and Wear Fire and Rescue Service, West 145 
Midlands Fire Service, and West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service.  The sample included level 1 146 
incident commanders (n = 17), who would be the first Fire and Rescue staff on scene at an 147 
incident, and level 2 commanders (n = 6), who provide a greater level of command at a higher risk 148 
or more complex incident. 149 
Participants completed a questionnaire relating to their previous operational exposure.  150 
This questionnaire was designed to identify how long each participant had spent in operational 151 
command positions.  The mean overall command experience was 13.77 years (SEM = 1.11; range: 152 
1.25-22.4 years).  There were 2 officers with less than 5 years of experience, 6 with 5-10 years 153 
inclusive, 7 with 11-15 years inclusive, 4 with 16-20 inclusive, and 4 with > 20 years.  The mean 154 
command experience in the current position was 7.10 years (SEM = 0.87; range: 0.08-18 years).  155 
There were 8 officers with less than 5 years of experience, 9 with 5-10 years inclusive, 5 with 11-156 
15 years inclusive, 1 with 16-20 inclusive, and no officers with more than 20 years of experience. 157 
 Equipment.  Each participant wore a head-mounted 1080p high-definition video camera 158 
measuring 42 mm × 60 mm × 30 mm (GoPro Hero 3, Half Moon Bay, USA) which captured 159 
video footage and sound.  The cameras were worn for the duration of each incident, from the time 160 
of initial alert.  These cameras captured all activity from the point of view of the wearer.  Footage 161 
was replayed to the participants on a laptop computer (HP Pavilion, Hewlett Packard), on a 15.2” 162 
screen during a cued-recall debrief interview. 163 
Procedure.  The six Fire and Rescue Services nominated stations that were likely to 164 
respond to a range of incidents.  All incident commanders at these stations were invited to 165 
participate in this research, and all volunteered to take part.  The researchers (SRC-H and PCB) 166 
spent six consecutive 24-hour periods at each Fire and Rescue Service, and were located with the 167 
duty watch of participating incident commanders.  Each participant was fitted with the camera at 168 
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the start of his or her shift, and it was checked for ease of use and comfort.  Watch members, 169 
although not direct participants, were briefed on the process and it was established whether or not 170 
they were comfortable with being filmed.  Only one watch member indicated s/he was not, and 171 
alternative arrangements were made for the duration of his/her shift.  Each participant was briefed 172 
fully on the procedure and gave their informed consent for their participation in accordance with 173 
local ethical approval through the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.  The two researchers 174 
observed the incidents, wearing observer jackets to clearly distinguish themselves from the 175 
incident command team.  Both were themselves sector competent operational fire officers (group 176 
commanders), and experienced incident commanders.  At incidents, one researcher observed the 177 
incident commander (positioned to minimize disruption to on going activity), and the other 178 
observed the scene in general. 179 
An information sheet that outlined the purpose of the study and the intended data usage 180 
was provided to anyone (including members of the public) at the incident who might have been 181 
captured in the footage.  The observation and filming could be stopped at any time at the request 182 
of an individual under observation, or operational monitoring officer in attendance, to limit any 183 
additional pressure that being observed may present.  As both researchers had a dual role as 184 
operational fire officers, professional judgement was used and the option was given to cease 185 
observation if it was deemed to be affecting the performance of the incident commander.  There 186 
were no occurrences where it was judged necessary to intervene.  187 
Within 24 hours of each incident, participants took part in a cued recall debrief.  This 188 
involved having them review the video footage taken from their video cameras.  They were asked 189 
to recall their thoughts and rationale for various decisions that were made at the time the footage 190 
was taken.  All footage was stored securely on a drive encrypted with TrueCrypt software 191 
(TrueCrypt version 5.1, TrueCrypt Foundation).  Footage was transcribed and analysed, and then 192 
erased within 30 days.  193 
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Results 194 
Coding of Activity 195 
The video footage of the activity of incident commanders was separately coded by the two 196 
researchers as indicative of situation assessment (SA), plan formulation (PF) or plan execution 197 
(PE).  Table 1 summarizes this coding and provides examples of each category.  These 198 
independently coded categories of activity represent the primary data, and inter-rater reliability 199 
checks revealed that the sequences of state transitions were highly reliable across the two 200 
coders.  Thus, three randomly chosen excerpts of video footage (one from each type of incident; 201 
see below) were scored by both researchers and there was > 95% agreement between the 202 
sequences of state transitions that were generated.  The independent codings were also compared 203 
to information provided by participants during the cued-recall interview.  In particular, the 204 
information provided by participants was used to confirm the correctness of the independent 205 
codings.  For example, the video footage might show the incident commander verbalizing a 206 
rationale for an activity that was coded as plan formulation; and during the interview, they might 207 
expand upon their rationale and intended plans, confirming that the independent coding was 208 
correct. 209 
To examine the level of situation awareness displayed immediately prior to either plan 210 
formulation or plan execution phases, it was coded as: Level 1, which corresponds to the 211 
perception of elements of the situation; Level 2, which relates to an understanding of the situation; 212 
and Level 3, which involves anticipation of the likely development of the situation (Endsley, 213 
1995).  Instances of each level can be seen in Table 1.   214 
____________________________ 215 
Insert Table 1 about here 216 
____________________________ 217 
 218 
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Data Analysis 219 
To assess whether or not the decision-making activities (i.e., SA, PF, PE) followed the 220 
sequence and phases predicted by normative decision models, a lag sequential analysis was 221 
conducted, in which the conditional probabilities that SA would be followed by PF (or PE), and 222 
PF by PE (or SA) were calculated (Sackett, 1979; see also, O’Connor, 1999).  To do so, a criterion 223 
position was first designated for all participants.  Here, this position was the first phase (SA, PF or 224 
PE) that was recorded within the ‘In attendance’ stage of the incident.  This stage is presaged by 225 
the incident commander’s arrival at the incident.  Following this point, coded activity in the form 226 
of the three categorised decision phases (i.e., SA, PF, PE) was used to generate a lag sequence of 227 
the transitions between the different categories.  For example, the lag sequence for the categorised 228 
decision phase list: SA, SA, SA, PE, PE, PF, PF, PF SA, PE would be: SA, PE, PF, SA, PE.  That 229 
is, the lag sequential analysis removes immediate repetition of the same decision phase and 230 
provides a trace of the category transitions.  The lag sequential analysis ended when the incident 231 
commander sent a ‘stop message’ to fire control, which signals the conclusion of the emergency 232 
phase of the incident is imminent.  233 
From these traces, the mean overall conditional probability of one phase being following 234 
by another was calculated (i.e. SA to PE or PF; PF to PE or SA; PE to SA or PF).  For example, a 235 
mean conditional probability of 0.5 for transitions from SA indicates that for a given incident 236 
transitions from SA were as likely to be to PF as to PE.  The analysis of the overall conditional 237 
probabilities of the phase transitions during the incidents was complemented by an analysis of the 238 
initial part of the incident: the criterion position and the very first transition from situation 239 
assessment.  These additional measures are important because it might be predicted that early in 240 
an incident there would be more evidence plan formulation than later in the incident; and that 241 
pooling the state transitions across the whole incident would underestimate the extent to which 242 
situation assessment is followed by plan formulation. 243 
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Nature of Incidents 244 
There were 33 incidents captured for analysis that covered a broad range of activity and 245 
were separated into three groups: 246 
(1) Those that posed a high degree of risk to either emergency responders or the public, but 247 
that were not time critical (High Risk/Time Available).  For example, one incident involved a road 248 
traffic collision where a car had collided with a lamppost on a dual carriageway, after rolling over 249 
several times.  The driver of the car was trapped inside the car, but had escaped serious injury.  250 
The focus of the operation was to extricate the driver using a ‘gold standard’ approach, where the 251 
maximum amount of space was created so the casualty could be removed on a long board as a 252 
precautionary measure, to avoid further damage to their neck or back that might have resulted 253 
from the accident.  The paramedics in attendance were satisfied that there was no time-critical 254 
nature to the casualty’s injuries, so there was little time pressure at this incident. 255 
(2) Those that posed great risk and for which urgent action was required to prevent harm or 256 
a dangerous escalation of the incident (High Risk/Time pressure).  One instance from this group 257 
involved a fire in a domestic property, where the incident commander had information to suggest 258 
that someone had deliberately been locked inside the burning property.  The incident commander 259 
had to consider the risk posed to both firefighters that would enter the property and the risk to the 260 
person they believed to be trapped.  The conditions were rapidly worsening, so the incident 261 
commander had little time available to decide which actions would effectively resolve the 262 
incident.  A second example from this group of incidents was a coach crash on a major motorway 263 
during rush hour.  There were more than 60 casualties in total at this incident, with some trapped 264 
and in a critical condition, who needed to be released for urgent hospital attention. 265 
(3) Those incidents where there was little risk posed, and no time constraints (Low Risk; 266 
cf. Alison, Doran, Long, Power, & Humphrey, 2013).  For example, during the course of data 267 
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collection, the UK experienced severe weather conditions that resulted in serious storm damage.  268 
At one incident, there was damage to the roof structure of a building with the result that there were 269 
large pieces of metal that might fall.  As the area had been closed, there was little risk posed to the 270 
public, and the incident commander had plenty of time available to decide how best to remove the 271 
damaged pieces and resolve the incident.  272 
Eight of the incident commanders took part in more than one incident.  However, as they 273 
were different types of incident (such as a house fire and a road traffic collision, rather than two 274 
house fires) they were (for the most part) treated as unique episodes for the purpose of the 275 
statistical analysis.  The total amount of command experience, within their current roles, in the 276 
three groups of incidents was similar: High Risk/Time Available (M = 5.45, SEM = 1.61), High 277 
Risk/Time Pressure (M = 7.53, SEM = 1.66), and Low Risk (M = 7.89, SEM =1.39).  ANOVA 278 
showed that there was no significant effect of group (F < 1).  279 
_____________________________ 280 
Table 2 about here 281 
_____________________________ 282 
Lag Sequential Analysis 283 
Overall Results.  Figure 1 depicts the mean conditional probabilities for transitions 284 
predicted by the normative three-step model (i.e., SA to PF, PF to PE, and PE to SA; black 285 
histogram) and the alternative transitions (i.e., SA to PE, PF to SA, and PE to PF; grey histogram).  286 
Inspection of this figure reveals that the incidents were most likely to involve transitions from 287 
situation assessment to plan execution rather than the predicted sequence of situation assessment 288 
to plan formulation.  Also, plan formulation was as likely to be followed by plan execution as 289 
situation assessment.  One-sample t-tests confirmed that: SA to PE transitions were more likely 290 
than (and SA to PF less likely than) would be expected by chance (i.e., 0.50), t(32) = 8.64, p < 291 
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0.001, d = 1.51.  As will become evident in the final section of the results, the nature of these 292 
transitions did not correlate with the experience of the incident commanders.  PF to PE (and PF to 293 
SA) transitions were no more likely than would be expected by chance, t(26) = 1.21, p > 0.23, d = 294 
-0.47; but, as we shall see, the nature of these transitions was correlated with the experience of the 295 
incident commanders.  However, as predicted by the model, PE was more likely to be followed by 296 
SA (and less likely to be followed by PF) than would be expected by chance, t(32) = 10.52, p < 297 
0.001, d = 1.83. 298 
The transitions between the three categories occurred in the context of the following mean 299 
frequencies of category per incident: SA = 41.45 (SEM = 6.10), PF = 5.51 (SEM = .93), and PE = 300 
17.06 (SEM = 2.25); confirming that many cases plan execution occurred without a preceding 301 
phase of plan formulation.   ANOVA confirmed that there was a main effect of category, F(2, 64) 302 
= 39.33, p < .0001, ηp
2
 = .55, and subsequent tests confirmed that there were more instances of 303 
SA than PE and more instances of PE than PF (smallest t(32) = 5.93, p < 0.0001, d = .92).  The 304 
mean frequencies of the different levels of situation awareness (1, 2 or 3) that preceded transitions 305 
from SA to either PF or PE are presented in a separate section below.  306 
The pattern of conditional probabilities was evident when analysis was restricted to the 307 
first incidents that were attended by the 23 participants: SA to PE transitions (M = 0.78; SEM = 308 
0.04) were more likely than would be expected by chance, t(22) = 6.99, p < .005, d = 1.46; PF to 309 
PE transitions (M = 0.41; SEM = 0.06) were no more likely than would be expected by chance, 310 
t(19) = 1.45, p > .16, d = -.49; and PE was more likely to be followed by SA (M = 0.90; SEM = 311 
0.02) than would be expected by chance, t(22) = 17.10, p < .005, d = 3.56.   312 
_____________________________ 313 
Insert Figure 1 about here 314 
_____________________________ 315 
 316 
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First Transitions and Criterion Position.  The key finding from the preceding analysis of 317 
the entire course of the 33 incidents was that SA was more likely to be followed by PE than PF.  It 318 
is also informative to examine the first transition from SA because this transition might reveal that 319 
SA was more likely to be followed by PF at the start of an incident.  However, for 27 of the 33 320 
incidents, the first transition from SA was to PE (sign test, p < 0.001).  Similarly, it is of interest to 321 
examine the nature of the criterion position – the first category for the lag-sequential analysis.  322 
Across the set of incidents, only one began with PF, and, of the remainder, 19 began with SA and 323 
13 with PE.  324 
Group Level Results.   The pattern of results evident in the overall analysis was consistent 325 
across the three types of incident.  The overall number of phase transitions (of any kind) was 326 
somewhat higher in Group High Risk/Time Pressure (n = 11; M = 43.64, SEM = 5.39) than in 327 
either group High Risk/Time Available (n = 9; M = 28.00, SEM = 8.30) or group Low Risk (n = 328 
13; M = 27.92, SEM = 11.93).  However, an ANOVA revealed that there was no statistically 329 
significant difference between the groups (F < 1).  The results of principal interest, the transitional 330 
probabilities for each group, are shown in the upper (from SA), middle (from PF), and lower 331 
(from PE) panels of Figure 2.  Inspection of these panels reveals that the pattern of results that was 332 
evident in the overall results was apparent for each of the three groups.  Separate ANOVAs for 333 
each of the three state transitions did not reveal any effects of group, largest F(2, 32) = 2.16, p > 334 
0.13, ηp
2
 = .13.  That is, at each type of incident: situation assessment was more likely to be 335 
followed by plan execution rather than plan formulation (upper panel).  There was little indication 336 
that plan formulation was any more often followed by plan execution than further situation 337 
assessment (middle panel); with the caveat that the nature of this transition was modulated by the 338 
experience of the incident commanders (see final section of the results).  Plan execution was more 339 
likely to be followed by situation assessment than plan formulation (lower panel).  The 340 
consistency between the three types of incident is clear.  However, it is possible that with a 341 
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broader range of incidents or with groups of incidents that were more coherent, differences based 342 
on type of incident might have been observed. 343 
_____________________________ 344 
Insert Figure 2 about here 345 
_____________________________ 346 
Levels of Situation Awareness 347 
The results of the lag-sequential analysis show that situation assessment was more likely to 348 
be followed by plan execution rather than plan formulation.  We also coded the level of situation 349 
awareness at each transition from situation assessment: Level 1 (perception), Level 2 350 
(understanding) or Level 3 (anticipation).  The left panel of Figure 3 depicts the levels of situation 351 
awareness prior to plan formulation and the right panel the corresponding scores for prior to plan 352 
execution.  The lower frequency of plan formulation than plan execution means that the scores are 353 
correspondingly lower in the left panel than in the right panel.  However, it is clear in both panels 354 
that the mean frequency of Level 3 situation awareness was low.  An ANOVA conducted on 355 
levels of situation awareness immediately preceding a transition to PF revealed a main effect of 356 
level, F (2, 64) = 8.48, p < 0.005, ηp
2 
= .21.  Paired-sample t-tests revealed that SA level 2 was 357 
more frequent than both SA level 1 (t(32) = 3.32, p < .005, d = 0.69) and SA level 3 (t(32) = 3.07, 358 
p < .005, d = 0.58).  A parallel ANOVA conducted on levels of situational awareness immediately 359 
preceding a transition to PE revealed a main effect of SA level, F (2, 64) = 9.39, p < 0.005, ηp
2 
= 360 
.23.  Paired-sample t tests revealed that SA levels 1 and 2 were more frequent than SA level 3 361 
(smallest t(32) = 3.66, p < .005, d = 0.90).  Thus, analysis of the level of situation awareness 362 
provided little evidence of nascent planning during situation assessment.  363 
_____________________________ 364 
Insert Figure 3 about here 365 
_____________________________ 366 
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Individual Differences in Experience 367 
There was evidence that the participants’ experience in the current role was differently 368 
related to the key transitional probabilities (from SA to PF/PE and from PF to PE/SA).  While the 369 
transition between situation assessment and plan formulation/execution was not related to 370 
experience (r = -0.04, p > 0.80), there was a significant correlation between experience (in years) 371 
and the transition from plan formulation to plan execution/situation assessment (r = 0.38, p < 372 
0.05); with increases in experience being related to an increased likelihood of plan formulation 373 
being followed by plan execution.  It is perhaps worth noting that a supplementary analysis 374 
revealed that the latter relationship was particularly marked for the High Risk/Time Pressure 375 
incidents (r = 0.90, p < 0.005).  Thus, the fact that the overall analysis indicated that plan 376 
formulation was no more likely to be followed by plan execution than by situation assessment 377 
needs to be qualified by the observation that the forms of transition from plan formulation are 378 
related to experience. 379 
Discussion 380 
Current operational models in the UK emergency services follow normative models of 381 
decision making in making the assumption that decision-making involves three stages: from 382 
situation assessment, to plan formulation, and then plan execution.  Indeed this approach is 383 
embodied in the model currently adopted in National Fire Policy in the UK (CFRAU, 2008), 384 
under whose auspices our sample of incident commanders operates.  However, the process of 385 
decision making at incidents has not been directly investigated or formally characterized in any 386 
detail.  The pattern of transitions (between situation assessment, plan formulation, and plan 387 
execution) that we observed across 33 incidents was inconsistent with the normative three-stage 388 
model outlined above.  More specifically, situation assessment was most frequently followed by 389 
plan execution rather than plan formulation, and plan formulation was no more likely to be 390 
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followed by plan execution than further situation assessment; with the latter transition being 391 
modulated by experience (see below).  This pattern of results was surprisingly consistent across 392 
incidents that posed quite different challenges (cf. Klein, 1993), with some being relatively 393 
straightforward and others involving multiple challenges that could have been addressed through 394 
the concurrent use of different strategies.  Moreover, a more fine-grained analysis of the levels of 395 
situation awareness that proceeded plan execution (or plan formulation) rarely indicated any form 396 
of prospection (i.e., anticipating the consequences of an action). 397 
It is important to note that while these findings do not represent an assessment of the 398 
effectiveness of the participants at any of the incidents, they do provide clear information about 399 
how decision-making unfolds over time at such incidents that complements findings from 400 
retrospective interviews (Klein et al., 1989).  The observation that situation assessment is most 401 
often immediately followed by plan execution suggests that particular situational cues might 402 
directly prime specific decisions that do not involve (explicit) plan formulation and evaluation, but 403 
remain directed towards the objective at hand (i.e., recognition primed decisions; e.g., Klein, 404 
1993).  This possibility is clearly related to the idea that situational cues could come to 405 
associatively provoke actions previously performed under similar circumstances (see Dickinson, 406 
1980; see also Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; Cohen-Hatton et al., 2013).  The fact that our 407 
participants’ experience in their current role did not correlate with the transition from situational 408 
assessment to plan execution appears to be inconsistent with these analyses, as is the fact that this 409 
transition did not differ across different types of incident.  However, because there was little 410 
variability in this transitional probability, the lack of a correlation is difficult to interpret.  In 411 
contrast, there was a relationship between experience and the transition from plan formulation and 412 
execution, and it is to this transition that we now turn. 413 
 On the relatively few occasions when participants engaged in explicit plan formulation, 414 
they were no more likely to implement the plan than to look for additional information.  One 415 
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interpretation of this pattern of results is that it reflects a process of deliberation under conditions 416 
of uncertainty (see van den Heuval et al., 2012).  The observation that experience in the current 417 
role was related to plan formulation being immediately followed by plan execution is consistent 418 
with this interpretation (cf. Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996).  However, it should be noted that this 419 
finding does not mean that a greater degree of operational experience equates to better incident 420 
command or command decisions.  The quality of decision making was not assessed here.  The fact 421 
remains that in our group of participants plan execution proceeded without plans being 422 
deliberately formulated (or options being evaluated), and with little evidence of prospection during 423 
situation assessment. 424 
The conclusion of the previous paragraph might appear counterintuitive, if not paradoxical: 425 
A role that might appear to be the embodiment of reflective decision making, in practice appears 426 
to involve little by way of explicit planning.  However, our results do not stand alone in 427 
supporting this conclusion.  Rake and Njå (2009; see also Klein et al., 1989) report the results 428 
from extensive, qualitative observations and interviews involving 22 incident commanders about 429 
incidents in Norway and Sweden.  The overwhelming impression gained from these observations, 430 
like those of Klein et al. (1989), was that the incident commanders in were not reflective or 431 
planful, but rather reflexive and procedural (cf. Klein, 1993).  Rake and Njå (2009) also reported 432 
the results from interviewing 28 incident commanders about hypothetical scenarios.  Under these 433 
conditions, these authors concluded that there was more evidence of deliberation.  However, such 434 
evidence is difficult to interpret and might not be representative of behavior at operational 435 
incidents.   436 
In summary, our results indicate that normative models of decision making, upon which 437 
the current operational decision models are based (e.g., CFRAU, 2008), do not capture the way in 438 
which decisions are made in the incident command operational environment, where reflexive 439 
processes operate alongside more reflective ones.  Our new results join those of Rake and Njå 440 
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(2009) and Klein et al. (1989) in suggesting that operational training and guidance needs to 441 
recognize and consider the influences of these different processes. 442 
443 
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Key points: 465 
1. Decision making is central to operational command and yet there is little evidence 466 
about how this process unfolds at emergency incidents. 467 
2. This study investigated decision making at a corpus of such incidents and revealed 468 
that the structure of decision making was not consistent with normative models that 469 
have shaped operational guidance. 470 
3. These findings provide a critical impetus for operational guidance and training to 471 
acknowledge the role of both reflective and reflexive processes.   472 
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Table 1: Coding Dictionary  546 
 
Decision Phase  
 
 
 
Incident Command 
Model Definition 
 
 
Description 
 
 
 
Example 
 
Situation Assessment (SA)        
 
Gathering incident,  
resource or hazard 
information. 
 
Acknowledgement of 
information relating to  
the environment,  
surveying scene. 
 
 
“No sign of any fire or 
smoke in the back. The 
guys across the road says 
he's not in... the doors are 
locked. It looks like it’s [the 
houses] back to back.” 
 
Plan Formulation (PF) Identification and 
prioritising objectives, 
developing tactical 
plan. 
Problem identification, 
ordering of tasks,  
planning activities, 
consideration of  
rationale. 
 
“We’ll have to keep the 
smoke there or start 
evacuating above…if we 
can't contain it we'll have 
to get a couple more BA 
[Breathing Apparatus] 
in…” 
 
Plan Execution (PE) Communicating actions 
and controlling activity.. 
Communication of  
tasks, controlling  
progress of tasks,  
setting tempo,  
changing activities. 
 
“Turn the PPV [positive 
pressure ventilation] on and 
open the windows…” 
 
 
 
Level of 
Situation 
Awareness 
 
 
Model 
Definition 
 
 
Description 
 
 
 
Example 
 
Level 1 
 
Perception 
 
Description or acknowledgement 
of elements of the situation. 
 
“There was smoke issuing” 
Level 2 Understanding Evidence of understanding what  
the elements of the situation mean 
in terms of the overall picture, or 
making sense of the elements. 
 
“It's still smoky enough to 
warrant a BA team down in 
the basement, plus also the 
floors are [broken], so I 
don't really want to. We 
need to go down there, 
clear it out.” 
Level 3 Anticipation Evidence of predicting the likely 
outcomes of actions, or the likely 
development of the situation. 
“Even if we break those 
windows, it’s not going to 
do much [in relation to 
ventilation]…” 
       547 
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Table 2: Categories of Incidents Attended 548 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 549 
Incident Category      High Risk/Time available    High Risk/Time Pressure     Low Risk 550 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 551 
Fire in domestic property  3   2   5 552 
Fire on other domestic property 0   1   0 553 
Fire in commercial property  0   4   1 554 
Other fire    1   0   2 555 
Road traffic collision   3   3   1 556 
Other rescue    1   1   2 557 
Animal rescue    0   0   1   558 
Dangerous structure   1   0   1  559 
______________________________________________________________________________ 560 
TOTAL    9   11   13 561 
______________________________________________________________________________ 562 
 563 
 564 
 565 
 566 
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Figure legends 568 
 569 
Figure 1.  Lag sequential analysis: Overall results.  Mean (+SEM) conditional probabilities of 570 
transition from situation assessment (SA to PF or PE; left pair of bars); from plan formulation (PF 571 
to PE or SA; central pair of bars); and from plan execution (PE to SA or PF; right pair of bars).  572 
Note: The sum of the mean conditional probabilities for each pair of transitions is 1 for transitions 573 
from SA and from PE.  However, because there were several incidents where no transitions from 574 
PF occurred, the sum of the mean conditional probabilities is less than one in the case of PF. 575 
 576 
Figure 2.  Lag sequential analysis: Group level results.  Mean (+SEM) conditional probabilities: 577 
of transitions from situation assessment (SA) to PF or PE (upper panel); from plan formulation 578 
(PF) to PE or SA (middle panel); and from plan execution (PE) to SA or PF (lower panel).  With 579 
the results separated by group: High Risk/Time Available (HR/TA; left pairs of bars), High 580 
Risk/Time Pressure (HR/TP; central pairs of bars), and Low Risk (LR; right pairs of bars).  Note: 581 
As in Figure 1, the sum of the mean conditional probabilities for each pair of transitions is 1 for 582 
transitions from SA and from PE.  However, because there were several incidents where no 583 
transitions from PF occurred, the sum of the mean conditional probabilities is less than one in the 584 
case of PF. 585 
 586 
Figure 3.  Levels of situation awareness during situation assessment: Mean frequencies (+SEM) of 587 
level 1 (perception), level 2 (understanding) and level 3 (anticipation) immediately preceding plan 588 
formulation (left panel) and plan execution (right panel).  589 
 590 
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Figure 1 592 
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Figure 2 594 
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